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A Georgist Perspective of Petroleum Taxation 
JOSEPH LEESON 
What is this you call property? It cannot be the earth, for 
the land is our mother, nourishing all her children, 
beasts, birds, fish and all men. The woods, the streams, 
everything on it belongs to everybody and is for the use of 
all. How can one man say it belongs only to him? 
~Massasoit 
Over a century ago, the town of Arden, Delaware, was founded on a 
unique single-tax-community system that radically altered the popular 
concept of land ownership.1 This system was premised on concepts 
developed by a man few know today but who was a major figure in 
economics during the 1800s, Henry George.2 George's public finance 
theory has been described as having received "intermittent attention 
over the years, with many eminent names in economics making at least 
a passing comment, but it has seen comparably little action in the policy 
debate arena and has been largely ignored by the modern era of 
academic economics."3 Although George's original plans for a single-tax 
system have failed to gain momentum in economic and tax policy circles, 
his single-tax-system philosophy is exemplified in twenty-first century 
natural resource taxation (most prominently in the taxation of oil). An 
application of the economic and procedural rationales that underpin 
George's single-tax system indicates that petroleum taxation should be 
based on a severance tax system that promotes the efficient distribution 
1. See Vill,age of Arden, Delaware, http://arden.delaware.gov/ Oast visited Nov. 19,
2017). 
2. See id.; See FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC Goons AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES 134-151
(1994). 
3. Zachary Gochenour & Bradley Caplan, An Entrepreneurial Critique of Georgism, 26 
Rev. Austrian Econ. 483, 485 (2013); see also Mark Blaug, Book Review to ROBERT V. 
ANDELSON, CRITICS OF HENRY GEORGE. A CENTENARY APPRAISAL OF THEIR STRICTURES ON 
PROGRESS AND POVERTY, 47 ECONOMICA 471, 472 (1980) ("As Milton Friedman said in a 
public debate in 1978, 'In my opinion the least bad tax is the property tax on the 
unimproved value of land, the Henry George argument of many, many years ago"'). 
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of common property benefits to the public. The outcome of such a system 
is the creation of a property rights institution that combines interests 
shared by libertarians (greater emphasis on individual rights through 
private ownership and less distortionary impacts on economic 
transactions), greens (greater incentives to preserve natural resources), 
and socialists (redistributing benefits attributable to property rights). 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The concept of property ownership has been contemplated and 
discussed over time between many of the most prominent philosophers. 
Plato originally supported collective ownership as a necessary method to 
promote the pursuit of common interest and to avoid social 
divisiveness. 4 Plato later retreated from this idealism in favor of 
Aristotle's more practical concept of private ownership, which 
emphasizes prudence and accountability. In support of this theory, 
Aristotle argued that "when everyone has a distinct interest, men will 
not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because 
everyone will be attending to his own business .... "5 John Locke's labor 
theory of property expanded on Aristotle's private property theories by 
premising property rights on the exertion of labor upon natural 
resources. 6 
Locke's labor theory of property does not extend to land ownership 
because historically it has been decided by first discovery or conquest, 7 
which originally did not conflict with Locke's philosophical musings 
because an unlimited supply can justify the taking of common land as 
private property, as historically land has been considered an overly 
abundant resource.8 In recent years, this concept has been criticized for 
4. See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Winter ed. 2016). 
5. Id. at 4.
6. See Karen I. Vaughn, John Locke and the Labor Theory of Value, 2 J. of Libertarian
Stud. 311, 313 (Locke started from the Biblical premise that God gave the world t;o all 
mankind in common. Under what circumstance, Locke asked in his Second Treatise on 
Government, could one be justified in enclosing a piece of that common heritage and 
claiming exclusive ownership? "Though the Earth, and all inferior creatures be common to 
all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but 
himself. The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his"). 
7. See generally Tonya Gonnella Frichner (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues),
Preliminary Study of the Impact on Indigenous Peoples of the International Legal 
Construct Known as the Doctrine of Discovery, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2010/13 (Feb. 4, 2010); 
SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST (1996); see also Johnson v. M'intosh, 21 U.S. 
543, 543 (1823); Oneida Indian Nation v. Cty. Of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 665-72 (1974). 
8. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS & UNITED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE FlrTURE OF OUR LAND (1999). See also Peter H. 
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being draconian on indigenous cultures and infringing on human 
rights.9 On the other hand, natural resources, particularly oil, create a 
unique problem in the property rights realm because of their limited 
supply, natural origins, and the labor required to implement their 
usage. 10 
A number of seventeenth-century philosophers, such as Hobbes, 
Locke, and Grotius, reasoned that a property rights system that vests 
complete ownership with private entities infringes on the community's 
freedoms because common property derived from the earth was created 
for the enjoyment of humankind, not for the enjoyment of any particular 
person.11 When an unowned natural resource is appropriated, an 
enforceable right to exclude is created, and a freedom that others 
previously had is denied. 12 Without unrestricted access to other 
resources of equivalent value or a redistribution of benefits to 
compensate for the loss of freedom, this appropriation of property rights 
creates an unequal distribution of freedom. 13 The dilemma created by 
this equal freedom issue is the need for private property ownership as 
an incentive to stimulate economic activity while trying to balance the 
need to prevent the exclusivity of natural property benefits that 
theoretically belong to humanity as a whole. 14 Due to population growth
and the fixed nature of land and natural resources, this issue has 
Lindert, Land Scarcity and American Growth, 34 J. ECON. HISTORY 851 (1974); Jens A 
Andersson, The Politics of Land Scarcity: Land Disputes in Save Communal Area, 
Zimbabwe, 25 J. S. AFR. STUD. 552, 553 (1999). 
9. See generally Frichner, supra note 7 (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues).
10. See Thomas Sikor et al., Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A ,
Conceptual Analysis Revisited, 93 WORLD DEV. 337, 337-49 (2017) (divides property rights 
of natural resources into eight categories and determines that there is a trend in the 
direction of compensated exclusions for natural resources); ROBERT L. HIRSCH ET AL., 
PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT 64 
(Feb. 2005) ("Oil scarcity and several-fold oil price increases due to world oil production 
peaking could have dramatic impacts. The decade after the onset of world oil peaking may 
resemble the period after the 1973-7 4 oil embargo, and the economic loss to the United 
States could be measured on a trillion-dollar scale."); Herman Daly et al., Modernizing 
Henry George, CENTER FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE STEADY STATE ECONOMY (Jul. 18, 
2010), http://www.steadystate.org/modernizing-henry-george/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
11. Vaughn, supra note 6, at 311-12 (Locke's labor theory of property ownership
premised ownership from natural resource exploitation had not been disputed because it 
involved a mixture of resources with labor making it property of the laborer.); See Chris 
Armstrong, Natural Resource Ownership, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1-2 
(Hugh LaFollete ed., 2017). 
12. See Hillel Steiner, Left-Libertarianism and the Ownership of Natural Resources,
BLEEDING HEART LIBERTARIANS (Apr. 24, 2012), http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/ 
2012/04/left-libertarianism-and-the-ownership-of-natural-resources/. 
13. See id.
14. See Armstrong, supra note 11, at 2-4.
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become more pronounced and has directly contributed to a growth of 
inequality.15 
Locke's labor philosophy of private ownership has played an 
important role in the implementation of real and natural property 
ownership, but there have been numerous proposals to enact a system 
that spreads the exclusive benefits associated with land and natural 
resources without implementing communal ownership. Many of the U.S. 
founding fathers joined Adam Smith in voicing concern with the concept 
of exclusive ownership over the Earth's benefits.16 In response to the 
congestion occurring in the North American colonies after the 
revolution, Thomas Paine was one of the first to propose a system that 
would impose an inheritance tax upon landowners for the right to 
prevent others from accessing the benefits of their property.17 Paine's 
theories on addressing the inequities of property ownership failed to 
garner support, but his social welfare ideas were later implemented in 
the form of an estate tax and universal social insurance system.18 
Paine's proposed system of using taxation to remedy a social inequity 
became relevant again when Henry George advocated for the property 
tax in his single-tax proposition.19 
Rather than trying to design a system that continuously 
redistributes common property and ignores the economic issues of 
socialism and communal ownership, George proposed to appropriate the 
value of land through a single tax on its unimproved value.20 Although 
the most promising economic aspect of single value taxation is the non­
distortionary effect a property tax has on commerce, 21 "George was not 
15. See Tim Rayner, The Earth i.s Full: Scarcity and Abundance Thinking, PlllLOSOPHY
FOR CHANGE (July 31, 2013), https://philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2013/07/31/the­
earth-is-full-scarcity-and-abundance-thinking/. See also Thorvaldur Gylfason & Gylfi 
Zoega, Inequaility and Economic Growth: Do Natural Resources Matter? (Center for 
Economic Studies and Ifo Institute, Working Paper No. 712, 2002) (increased dependence 
on natural resources tends to go along with less rapid economic growth and greater 
inequality in the distribution of income across countries). 
16. See Lexington, Estate Tax and the Founding Fathers: You Can't Take It With You, 
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 24, 2010), https://www.economist.com/blogs/lexington/2010/10/estate 
_tax_and_founding_fathers. 
17. See THOMAS PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE 10-17 (1797). 
18. See ERIC SCHLIESSER, TEN NEGLECTED CLASSICS OF PlllLOSOPHY 56-58 (2016). 
19. See Brent Ranalli, After Paine: Henry George's "Single Tax", THE GLOBALIST (July 
4, 2015), https://www.theglobalis t.com/after-paine-henry-george-single-tax/. 
20. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 120-40 (1920).
21. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
PUBLIC SERVICES, 27 4-333 (197 4) ("Not only was Henry George correct that a tax on land 
is non-distortionary, but in an equilibrium society . . . tax on land raises just enough 
revenue to finance the (optimally chosen) level of government expenditure."); Colin Read, 
The Henry George Theorem, in THE PuBLIC FINANCIERS, 217-19 (2016). 
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simply trying to design a system of taxation devoid of untoward 
commercial consequences"; he was trying to solve the ethical problem of 
inequity driven by land ownership, which can lead to its own economic 
problems and social unrest.22 "His goal was nothing less than to make 
all land common property, but he realized that, '[i]t is not necessary to 
confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent."'23 
George's theories were primarily concerned with the exclusivity of 
land ownership, but libertarians have found much of the same ethical 
reasoning to extend to all real property of limited supply.24 Despite the 
close relationship George's single-tax theories have with land, the 
Georgist tax system can be applied to numerous other types of activities, 
such as hoarding, pollution, and natural resource extraction. "Much like 
Pigovian taxes, the Georgist system is designed to levy taxes with the 
intent of deterring and punishing undesirable behavior but, unlike 
Pigovian's externality approach, the Georgist tax system places 
emphasis on the avoidance of taxing productive economic behaviors; like 
engaging in labor, and buying and selling goods."25 Henry George's 
theories have served as a foundation for Geolibertarian taxation 
principles that extend the land ownership issues to all resources derived 
from common property, such as water, air, space, and oil,26 that are not 
eligible for private ownership.27 Therefore, society should tax those who
own exclusive natural opportunities.28 The Georgist tax theories have 
also had a significant influence on tax policy development in the United 
22. George, supra not,e 20, at 121 ("the fact that the land on which and from which all
must live is made exclusive property of some. Like rip van winkle they lay down and sleep, 
not having done anything, but rather from the increase of the population, owners of land 
become millionaires. This creat;es a syst;emic problem of inequity because as common 
property such as land grows in value, workers are then required to pay more for the 
privilege to work on it''). 
23. Charles L. Hooper, Henry George, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc /bios/George.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
24. See Robert F. Conrad & Malcolm Gillis, Progress and Poverty in Developing
Countries: Rents and Resource Taxation, in HENRY GEORGE AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 25 (Stephen R. Lewis ed.), http://www.cooperative­
individualism.org/gillis-malcolm_progress-and-poverty-in-developing-countries.pdf 
("[Adam] Smith made a strong case for classifying natural resource deposits as "land" . . .  
Harry Gunnison Brown, also considered natural resource deposits as essentially no 
different from unimproved agricultural landff'). 
25. Georgism, Capitalism, and Socialism, A GEORGIST PERSPECTIVE, 
http://povertythin.kagain.com/controversies/a-word-from-the-sponsor-of-the-film-the-end­
of-poverty-georgism-capitalism-and-socialism/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
26. See Fred Foldvary, The Geolibertarian Ethics of Land Rent, BLEEDING HEART 
LIBERTARIANS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/the-
geolibertarian-ethics-of-land-rent/. 
27. See GEORGE, supra not;e 20, at 322-35.
28. See id.
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States.29 In most countries, particularly least developed countries, "rent 
capture has become a widely sought, perhaps paramount, goal of tax 
policy in natural resource sectors .... "30 
SINGLE-TAX SYSTEM 
Henry George's single-tax system proposal was a simple solution to 
address the inequities associated with land as well as alleviate the 
strains associated with labor taxation. The proposal was to eliminate all 
taxes and impose a single tax on the undeveloped value of land.31 The
single tax would be designed so that it levies a rent on land value while 
not applying any tax on productive activities, such as earnings or 
salaries.32 Theoretically, this proposal would be easy to administer, 
redistribute benefits exclusive to landowners, and allow individuals to 
retain the products of their labor.33 Furthermore, it would help to fix the 
injustices associated with tax burdens being placed on the working man 
and reduce incentives for land speculation. 34 The ultimate goal of the 
tax was to shift the land ownership from exclusive, individual 
ownership to one of communal, beneficial ownership.35
Many of the advocates for a Georgist taxation system on 
undeveloped common property hold that it is distinguishable from 
exchange taxes because it does not bear on production.36 Henry George 
most prominently stressed that "land value does not express a reward of 
production'' but rather "expresses the exchange value of a monopoly;"; 
29. See Alanna Hartzok, In the History of Tlwught: Henry George's "Single Tax,"
EARTH RIGHTS INSTITUTE, http://www.earthrightsinstitute.org/news/publications/essays­
reports-etc/240-in-the-history-of-thought-henry-george-s-single-tax (Dec. 2, 2018), ("The 
1887 Wright Act in California enabled bonds raised by local irrigation districts to be paid 
from the increase in land values [ . . .  ]" United States' taxpayers currently subsidi7.e the 
irrigation needs of agribusiness through tax credits, quotas and redistribution of tax 
revenue ... . Alaska's state constitution vests the ownership of oil and other natural 
resources in the people as a whole and the state's Permanent Fund distributes substantial 
oil revenue as citizen dividends to state residents.). See also Land Reform, THE REMEDY, 
http://www.henrygeorge.org/rem2.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) ('1n the United States, 
the largest landholding entities, in terms of area, are oil and timber companies, holding 
many millions of acres"). 
30. Conrad & Gillis, supra, note 24, at 26. 




35. See Bob DeNigris, Henry George and the Single Tax, THE ARDEN GEORGIST GILD
(Oct. 2007), http://www.henrygeorge.org/pdfs/denigris.pdf. 
36. See E.S.L., Why Henry George Had a Point, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2015/04/0l/why-henry-george-had-a-point. 
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therefore, a "tax upon the value of land is the best tax that can be 
imposed . . . ."37 "It is the most easily collected, does not allow cost 
shifting to third parties like corporate taxes do with consumers, the tax 
on land value possesses in the highest degree the element of certainty 
and due to the immovable, unconcealable character of the land itself it 
is beneficial for taxing enforcement purposes."38 
The theoretical element of George's tax system that tax is non­
distortionary has drawn a significant amount of interest from 
economists.39 "George's central economic argument [for the single value 
tax system] is that the supply of land and natural resources are 
perfectly inelastic, therefore there is no efficiency loss from land value 
taxation."40 A land value tax removes the land value subsidy, and most 
importantly, it does not interfere with consumption or production. "To 
lllllimize the need for distortionary taxes, economists have 
recommended maximizing rent taxes, which are supposed to be 
neutral."41 Milton Friedman was a strong supporter of the property tax 
and argued that "the property tax is the least bad tax there is," 
prominently stating: "[T]hink of the original and indestructible 
properties of the soil. The least dangerous and harmful tax is a tax on 
something of which there is an inelastic supply."42 On the other hand, 
critics argue that there is no way to determine the untransformed value 
of the land, even from one individual's subjective standpoint.43
Many rankings indicate that there is high residential satisfaction 
associated with taxation regimes influenced by the single-tax system. 
Alaska constitutionally vests natural resource ownership to the public 
and manages this interest through oil extraction and production taxes, 
which has helped it to be the only state where the wealth gap has 
decreased during the past decade.44 World Bank data indicates tha� 
37. GEORGE, supra note 20, at 134. 
38. Id.
39. See Gochenour & Caplan, supra note 3, at 484-85 ("Fred Foldvary writes, 'Debates
on tax reform, for example, focus on tapping streams of income or output, ignoring the 
possibility and advantage of using rents unrelated to human effort, thus eliminating 
disincentives, tax wedges, and excess burdens[.]"'). 
40. Id. at 484.
41. Diderik Lund, Rent Taxation for Nonrenewable Resources 2 (Univ. Oslo Dep't of
Econ.,Working Paper No. 01, 2009), http://hdl.handle.net1l0419/47338. 
42. Brian Leubitz, Prop 13: What Would Milton Friedman Do?, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS
REPORT (Aug. 9, 2009), http://californiaprogressreport.com/site/prop-13-what-would­
milton-friedman-do. 
43. See David J. Heinrich, Murray Rothbard and Henry George, MISES INSTITUTE (Feb.
23, 2004), https://mises.org/blog/murray-rothbard-and-henry-george. 
44. See Scott Santens, Is the Solution to Extreme Wealth Inequality Really - Alaska?,
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/ 
extreme-wealth-inequality-alaska-model/. 
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there is a direct correlation between larul rent in the form of property 
taxes and freedom. In the Heritage Foundation's freedom index, 
Singapore, a country that imposes a higher property tax than most of 
the world and pays its citizens a dividend similar to Alaska, is at the top 
of the list.45 Similarly, Hong Kong has topped the index and is a city 
consisting completely of public land that collects enough rent to keep 
income taxes low. 46 
In oil rich countries, the establishing methods to retain and 
redistribute the natural resource benefits within the country has helped 
to alleviate poverty. When Middle Eastern OPEC countries are 
compared to other countries with identical poverty levels during OPEC's 
growth and establishment, "OPEC countries have shown roughly double 
the reduction of people below the absolute poverty line."47 Not only has 
establishing an OPEC redistribution helped to alleviate poverty levels, 
"middle eastern OPEC countries have experienced considerable 
reductions in resource inequality since 1975."48 Furthermore, as a result 
of the increased revenues from a nationalized oil system, Middle 
Eastern countries have been able to invest more in socially productive 
sectors, such as education and military development.49 
AN OVERVIEW OF PETROLEUM TAX SYSTEMS 
There is no tax structure in the world that has been more impacted 
by Georgist ideals than the tax and redistributive systems of the oil and 
gas industry. The "IMF (2012) identifies 22 countries where petroleum 
revenues comprise at least 10 percent of national GDP, a fraction that 
rises as high as 80 percent (Angola) or even 90 percent (Timor-Leste) in 
certain cases."50 Oil taxation poses a unique issue because, unlike land, 
undeveloped oil reserves are relatively impossible to accurately quantify 
unless the land is drilled and the oil well is emptied. 51 Geological 
45. See Jeffery J. Smith, Learned Libertarians Lean Toward Land Rents, PROGRESS
(Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.progress.org/articles/learned-libertarians-lean-toward-land­
dues. 
46. Id.
47. Adam Bird & Malcolm Brown, The History and Social Consequences of a
Nationalized Oil Industry 15 (June 2, 2005) (unpublished paper) (on file with Stanford 
University). 
48. Id. at 19.
49. See id. at 20-22.
50. James L. Smith, Issues in Extractive Resource Taxation: A Review of Research
Methods and Models 3 (IMF Working Paper No. 12-287). 
51. See Breffni O'Rourke, How Do Experts Estimate the Size of Oil and Gas Fields?,
RADIOFREEEUROPE (Oct. 17, 2008, 9:49 GMT), https://www.rferl.org/a/How_Do_Experts 
_Estimate_The_Size_Of_0il_And_Gas_Fields/1330630.html. 
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experts can create estimates by examining seismic and aeromagnetic 
data for similarities with other oil wells, but this data is a scientific 
guess at best. 52 A proven reserve has a 90 percent probability of being 
accurately quantified, but these reserves need to be producing to 
achieve this accuracy.53 Due to experts' inability to measure and 
quantify oil amounts prior to extraction, it is administratively 
impossible to tax petroleum while it is underground. It would thus be 
unrealistic to apply George's single-tax system on the undeveloped 
value of oil reserves. As a result, governments throughout the world 
have applied Georgian systems that redistribute petroleum (a 
nonrenewable resource) benefits by implementing tax instruments that 
apply to the profits and volume of extracted petroleum. 
In determining an effective tax system, George listed certain factors 
required for an effective tax: (1) it bears lightly upon production, (2) it is 
easily and cheaply collected and falls directly upon the ultimate payers, 
(3) it provides the least opportunity for tyranny or corruption by officials
and the least temptation for lawbreaking and evasion by taxpayers, and
(4) it bears equally as to give no citizen an advantage or disadvantage.?4 
Most countries collect the government's share of economic benefit
through production or income-based taxation.55 Other less popular
taxation methods include value-added taxes, customs duties, and
various rental payments. 56 The three most prevalent means through
which countries establish and implement redistributive oil tax systems
are royalties, income taxes, and resource rent taxes. 57 
Royalties 
Originally, the favored method of oil taxation was through royalty 
arrangements. 5s Royalties have been attractive due to the 
administrative advantage of mandatory payments based on volume or 
value.59 Royalties typically come in some form of severance or ad 
valorem tax, but some countries have introduced an earnings component 
by affiliating the tax with production levels (Chile, Ecuador, Norway, 
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See GEORGE, supra note 20, at 132.
55. See Emil M. Sunley, Thomas Baunsgaard & Dominique Simard, Revenue from the
Oil and Gas Sect.or: Issues and Country Experience 10-13 (June 8, 2002) (unpublished 
post-conference draft), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/lNTTP A/Resources/Sunley Paper 
.pelf. 
56. See id. at 2.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 22-25.
59. See id. at 2-3.
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and Thailand) or nominal return (Peru and Kazakhstan).60 Due to 
royalty calculations being associated with value or volume, they are less 
administratively complicated to enforce than income-based taxes. On 
the other hand, companies disfavor this approach because, if it is not 
profit-based, it does not allow for cost reduction and can cause 
struggling oil companies to be forced out of business. Although royalties 
are still a popular tax scheme implemented by oil producing countries, 
governments have begun to emphasize tax systems that are more 
closely related to corporate revenue and income so that countries may 
be able to share in the increased profits that result from higher oil 
prices.61 
Income-based Taxes 
"In the last 60 years, the balance has shifted away from royalties 
toward the use of levies based on net income: although producing 
countries typically use both royalties and income-taxes, income-based 
taxes have gained over the decades in relative importance."62 
Government reliance on income-based oil taxes tend to aggravate 
administrative issues because the revenue reductions that result from 
noncompliance appear to outweigh any of the incremental benefits 
associated with income-based taxes.63 "This is especially the case where 
royalties are 'progressive,' the rates of which vary positively with 
market prices."64 Although administratively difficult, countries have 
trended toward progressive production-sharing agreements and net 
income systems as a result of the positive fluctuations in oil prices. 65 
Taxes imposed on oil companies' profits and revenues fall away from 
60. See id.
61. See Bryan C. Land, Resource Rent Taxation-Theory and Experience 3 (Sept. 22, 
2008) (IMF Working Paper), https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/ 
2008/taxnatural/pdf/land.pdf ("The reason for this, at least in part, is the predominance of 
regressive fiscal regimes designed in the 1980s and 1990s. Common features of these fiscal 
regimes had included low royalties and flat rate income taxation combined with generous 
allowances (accelerated depreciation and investment uplifts). In the mining industry, 
many governments had also offered tax holidays in the depths of depression in the sector, 
backed by stabilization agreements. In the oil industry, the prevalence of volume rather 
than profit-based production sharing, coupled with generous cost recovery provisions to 
lure investors, entailed limited government sharing in any price escalation"). 
62. Michael C. Durst, Improving Natural Resource Taxation in Developing Countries,
NAT. RESOURCE GoVERNANCE INST. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/ 
improving-natural-resource-taxation-developing-countries. 
63. See id. 
64. Id.
65. See Petter Osmundsen & Kjell Lovas, Trends and Trade-offs in Petroleum Tax
Design, (USAEE, Working Paper No. 09-024, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=l5l 7149. 
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the administrative benefits associated with applying taxes on 
undeveloped common property due to the inherent administrative 
difficulties in measuring net income. These difficulties leave them more 
prone to taxpayer avoidance through techniques such as base erosion 
and profit shifting.66 Simpler taxes, such as royalties, are calculated 
based on the gross value of the extracted resource while income taxes 
are derived from net profits, which are always smaller than gross 
revenues.67 "Therefore, if an extractive company succeeds in 
understating the fair market value of its extracted product by even a 
small percentage, the government's revenue losses under a royalty 
might be negligible, whereas the government's revenue losses under an 
income-based tax are likely to be much more serious." Critics of income­
based oil taxes argue that governments have not been able to design 
profit calculations that overcome these vulnerabilities.68 
Income-based taxes on petroleum can also lead to an over­
dependence on petroleum tax revenues, which has occurred in Norway 
where over 32 percent of Norway's total revenues come from taxes, 
excise duties, and other revenues from petroleum activities. 69 "On top of 
its 27 percent corporation income tax, Norway levies an additional 51 
percent resource extraction tax on the exploration, development, and 
production of petroleum."70 This poses a unique problem in Norway 
since petroleum exports have declined over the past decade.71 
On the other hand, it is not unusual for oil rich countries in the 
Middle East to have low or no income taxes on corporations but apply an 
income tax solely on the oil industry.72 For example, "[i]n Bahrain, there 
are no corporate taxes with the exception of companies undertaking 
extraction and refining activities ... [who] are subject to tax at the rate 
of 46 [percent] ."73 Petroleum production and refining accounts for 20 
percent of Bahrain's gross domestic product, 70 percent of Bahrain's 
66. See Michael C. Durst, Improving the Performance of Natural Resource Taxation in
Developing Countries, 9-12 (ICTD, Working Paper 60, 2016), http://www.ictd.ac/ 
publication/improving-the-performance-of-natural-resource-taxation-in-developing­
countries/. 
67. See id. at 9. 
68. See Durst, supra note 62. 




72. See generally  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, OIL AND GAS TAX GUIDE FOR THE 
MIDDLE EAST 2015 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en /services/tax/publications/middle­
east-oil-gas-guide.html (assessing country-specific developments of oil and gas fiscal and 
regulatory schemes in the Middle East). 
73. Id. at 5.
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export receipts, and over 80 percent of government revenues. 74
Resource Rent Tax 
The most unique and interesting petroleum taxation strategy 
arising in recent years is the resource rent tax (RRT). Royalty tax 
regimes can distort economic decisions because, without cost deductions, 
they make certain high-cost extraction projects unprofitable that would 
otherwise be profitable without the tax expenses. 75 Australia and Papua 
New Guinea have responded to this discrepancy by creating the 
Resource Rent tax which "is imposed only if the accumulated cash flow 
from the project is positive ... and the net negative cash flow (in the 
early years of a project) is accumulated at an interest rate that, in 
theory, is equal to the company's opportunity cost of capital (adjusted 
for risk)."76 "[T]he objective of resource rent taxation is to capture rent 
while leaving to the investor at least the minimum required return on 
investment."77 The RRT allows for a deduction equal in present value to 
the investment itself, and the deduction typically exceeds most 
depreciation reductions allowed under corporate income tax systems. 78 
Investment-indeed any yearly negative net cash flow-is carried 
forward for later deduction, along with interest accumulation, as soon as 
revenues allow. 79 
When Australia's tax review commission proposed that royalties be 
replaced with a uniform resource rent tax, it argued that "a well­
designed rent-based resource tax is less likely to distort investment and 
production decisions."80 Properly designed, an RRT captures a share of 
the natural resource rent, which is the return over and above the 
company's opportunity cost of capital.81 If the tax base in subsequent 
years is sufficient to allow complete, effective deduction of the carry­
forward, this tax base can ensure that only the rent is taxed.82 "But it is 
far easier to state this objective than it is to design taxes that can do 
74. See id.
75. See Lund, supra note 41, at 5.
76. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, FlSCAL POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN
OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES 159 (Jeffrey M. Davis, Annalisa Fedelino & Rolando Ossowski 
eds., 2003). 
77. Land, supra note 61, at 7.
78. See id. at 14. 
79. See id.
80. John Freebairn, Royalties or Resource Rent Taxes?, TAX & TRANSFER POL. INST. 
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.austaxpolicy.com/which-is-more-efficient-and-effective-
comparing-royalty-and-resource-rent-taxes/. 
81. See id.
82. See id. 
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this."83 The World Bank has highlighted two significant hurdles in 
implementing an effective resource rent tax: (1) designing an RRT 
system that is efficient at extracting rents when the existence and size 
of the resource is uncertain and (2) implementing the system with 
government informational and practical limitations. 84 
Unfortunately, the RRT in practice also poses several issues 
regarding its implementation. The unpredictability and volatility of 
commodity prices makes the stable revenue stream of royalty taxes 
more desirable than resource rent taxes. 85 On the other hand, resource 
rent tax regimes benefit private companies because the effective tax 
rate accounts for market fluctuations, thereby allowing for more 
stability for industry revenues.86 "In practice, [the resource rent tax] has 
always been imposed together with other taxes to offset these 
disadvantages."87 "Thus, typically in a royalty/tax regime RRT is 
combined with royalty and corporation tax, either as a final tax or as 
supplementary levy on pre-tax income, payments of which would be 
deductible for corporation tax purposes."88 The result of such a 
combination is the ability for governments to receive a steady stream of 
royalty tax revenue while simultaneously capturing excess benefits from 
commodity price spikes through the operation of the RRT. 89 
NATIONALIZATION OF OIL SUPPLIES 
"George viewed the institution of private property in land as the 
'curse and menace of modern civilization,' for which the remedy was the 
conversion of all land to common property."90 George advocated for a tax 
system to address this issue, but there has been a trend amongst oil-rich 
countries to legitimize the public's right to natural resources through 
83. Land, supra note 61, at 7.
84. See Arvind Virmani, Efficiency of Practical Resource Rent Tax Systems: Threslwld
Rates and Income Taxes 1 (World Bank Discussion Paper, No. DRD164, 1986), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/301531468327561218/Efficiency-of-practical­
resource-rent-tax-system -threshold-rates-and-income-taxes. 
85. Freebairn, supra note 80, at 4 (''Given wide swings over time in commodity prices,
a royalty generates a more stable stream of special taxation revenue than the resource 
rent tax."). 
86. Id. ("mining industry revenues and profits are more stable under a resource rent
tax regime."). 
87. Land, supra note 61, at 11.
88. THE TAXATION OF PETROLEUM AND MINERALS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND 
PRACTICE (Philip Daniel, Michael Keen & Charles McPherson, eds. 2010). 
89. Land, supra note 61, at 11. ("The effect is that the government receives some
revenue before the project reaches the point at which RRT is imposed."). 
90. Conrad & Gillis, supra note 24, at 29.
708 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STIJDIFS 26:2
governmental involvement in the supply and extraction of petroleum. 91 
Oil-producing countries implement this type of system by taking an 
equity interest in, or controlling access to, the petroleum supply through 
production-sharing arrangements or nationalizing the oil supply.92
Although this system manages to capture and redistribute benefits of 
natural resources, it forfeits the necessary benefits of private ownership 
emphasized in a Georgian tax system. 
In the Middle East, the majority of countries relies on some form of 
production sharing.93 Oil in Iraq is state-owned, and its extraction is
controlled through technical service contracts awarded to international 
oil companies when the government seeks to expand production.94 Iraq
also applies a corporate income tax at a low rate of 15 percent but 
foreign companies working in fields of oil and gas production, extraction, 
and related industries are all subject to a 35 percent tax rate of income 
earned in lraq.95 In the United States, Article 8 of Alaska's state 
constitution nationalizes the oil supply by placing property interest in 
natural resources within a state public trust, which allows all citizens to 
have an ownership interest in the oil extracted from the state's lands.96 
Article 9, Section 15 of the Alaska Constitution developed the Alaska 
permanent fund that facilitates this ownership interest by distributing 
profits to the state's citizens.97 Due to the unpredictable nature of 
resource extraction, establishing oil revenue funds has become popular 
among oil-producing countries which are believed to stabilize the 
economy and provide intergenerational redistribution of oil wealth. 98 
A tax system is preferable to nationalizing the oil supply because of 
the significant issues associated with the deprivatization of natural 
resources. When natural resources are privately owned, coordination 
and application of resources are determined by market incentives that 
direct resources to where they are highest valued.99 Furthermore, 
91. See Associated Press, The Troubling Trend of Nationalization, NBC NEWS (May 2, 
2006, 6:33 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12600039/ns/business-oil_and_energy/tl 
troubling-trend-nationalization/#.WjbM2LpFyhc. 
92. See Sunley, Baunsgaard & Simard, supra note 55, at 10-13.
93. See J. William Carpenter, The Biggest Oil Producers in the Middle East,
lNVESTOPEDIA, https://www .investopedia.com/articles/investing/101515/biggest-oil-
producers-middle-east.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
94. See Oil and Tax Guide for the Middle East, supra note 72, at 19-24.
95. See id.
96. See ALAsKA CONST. art. VIII.
97. See id. at art. IX,§ 15.
98. See Dina Azhgaliyeva, The Effect of Fiscal Policy on Oil Revenue Fund: The Case
of Kazakhstan, 5 J. Eurasian Stud. 157, 157-58 (2014). 
99. See Richard Stroup & John A. Baden, Property Rights and Natural Resource
Management: A Bibliographical Essay by Stroup and Baden, ONLINE LIBR. OF LIBERTY
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privately-owned property rights preserve individual freedoms, 
encourage maximizing property value through ownership incentives, 
and allow free market powers to determine price levels based on the 
level of inputs and outputs of comparable products. 100 These essential 
benefits are either weakened or lost when the government takes 
complete control of common property like petroleum resources. 101 Much 
like the nationalization trends in the Middle East, governmental 
involvement raises the inevitable possibility of "conflicts of interest 
arising from the government's role as regulator overseeing the 
environmental or social impact of a project, which may differ from its 
objectives as a shareholder." 102 Corruption becomes most opportune 
when the government has a significant involvement with the 
contracting and business of oil extraction; therefore, equity 
arrangements are prone to corruption. 103 This principle has been 
prominently exemplified in countries, such as Venezuela and Brazil, 
where public officials' corrupt practices have been involved with the 
nationalized oil business. 104 
(last modified Apr. 13, 2016), http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/property-rights-and-natural­
resource-management-a-bibliographical-essay-by-stroup-and-baden#levlsecO 1. 
100. See D. Benjamin Barros, Property And Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 36, 47 
(2009); Sean Ross, How are Capitalism and Private Property Related?, lNVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040615/bow-are-capitalism-and-private­
property-related.asp?lgl=myfinance-layout-no-ads (last visited Apr. 6, 2015); Jeremy 
Waldron, Property and Ownership, STAN. ENCYCWPEDIA OF PHIL. (2004), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/property. 
101. See Benjamin Barros, Property And Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 36, 47
(2009); Sean Ross, How are capitalism and private property related?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040615/bow-are-capitalism-and­
private-property-related.asp?lgl=myfinance-layout-no-ads; Property and Ownership, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016 
Edition) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/property. 
102. Sunley, et al., supra note 55, at 10.
103. See Munza Mushtaq, Corruption in state-owned enterprises is a global menace,
INT'L ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE (Dec. 3, 2016), https://iaccseries.org/ 
blog/corruption-in-state-owned-enterprises-is-a-global-menace/ ("State-owned enterprises 
are considered vital to many developed and developing countries; however, both 
corruption and bribery continue to plague many of them, despite welcome changes 
adopted by countries towards addressing these issues"). See generally Rabah Arezki & 
Markus Bruckner, Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence From Panel Data 
Regressions (IMF, Working paper No. 09/267, Dec. 2009) (measuring state involvement 
and corruption in government dealings with oil agreements). 
104. See Gustavo Coronel, The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela, CATO (March
2008), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela 
(One of the main reasons for high levels of corruption in Venezuela has been "the record 
oil income obtained by the nation, money going directly into Chavez's pockets[.]"); Brazil 
Corruption Scandals: All You Need to Know, BBC NEWS (April 8, 2018) ("Since 2014 
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Not only does nationalizing the oil supply create problems 
associated with deprivatizing property, the lack of success by state­
owned petroleum enterprises indicates that governments are ill­
equipped to manage the oil production and extraction business. Some 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) have produced substantial returns 
during periods of high mineral prices; however, there are many 
examples of countries where SOE's have failed to create anything other 
than operating losses.105 In Indonesia, the SOE, PERTAMINA, incurred 
over $10 billion in debts due to operating losses between 1972 and 
1976.106 During the same period, the Bolivian SOE, COMIBOL, failed to 
contribute any tax revenues to the treasury for a twenty-year stretch. 107 
"Brazil's Petrobras and Colombia's Ecopetrol experienced consistent 
operating losses in the late '70's."108 "In 1981 and 1982, Argentina's 
state oil company incurred annual losses of over $3.7 billion."109 "These 
were the largest losses incurred by any company in the world in these 
years."110 "Other mineral SOE's, including Zambia Industrial and 
Mining, Brazais CVRD, and Zaire's Gecamines, have made only modest 
contributions to their national treasuries in recent years because of low 
mineral prices (copper) or other internal factors."m 
GEORGIAN TAX SYSTEM OF PETROLEUM 
The ability to correct the inequitable distribution of benefits from 
common property while retaining the benefits associated with private 
property rights is the primary factor behind implementing an effective 
Georgian system of tax collection. To implement such a system 
effectively, it must be administratively operational enough to maximize 
governmental revenues while also enforcing a property rights 
framework that reflects the communities' interest in natural resources. 
As a result, the best way to apply George's philosophies to the extraction 
and use of oil is a severance tax framework with a long-term fund to 
account for industry fluctuations. 
Balancing the public's interests in natural resources with private 
interests has proven to be a complicated task for countries all around 
Brazil has been gripped by a scandal that started with a state-owned oil company and 
grew to encapsulate people at the very top of business - and even presidents"). 
105. See Conrad & Gillis, supra note 24, at 27-29.
106. See id. 
107. See id. 




A GEORGIST PERSPECTIVE OF PETROLEUM TAXATION 711 
the world. Most countries have structured their extraction rights 
systems to account for the public interest. In virtually all countries, 
with the exclusion of the United States, the public retains partial rights 
to natural resources by vesting extraction rights with the central 
government.112 These systems have led to burdensome licensing 
processes that distribute extraction rights through contractual 
arrangements with oil companies that seek exploration and extraction 
of oil underground.113 Alternatively, the United States' system avoids 
these inefficiencies by vesting to the surface land owner the extraction 
rights of underground resources.114 Therefore, the rights to common 
property ownership in the United States are completely vested in 
private entities or individuals.115 
But how can an extraction rights system, like the American system, 
address the issues associated with communal ownership while vesting 
ownership with private entities? By enforcing a severance tax on 
extracted natural resources, taxes can separate communal rights from 
private ownership. Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom theorize that 
common property rights and the duties imposed on third parties 
through property rights are the products of applying the rules to natural 
resources.116 A Georgian tax system falls under Schlager and Ostrom' s 
meaning of rules, which are defined as "generally agreed-upon and 
enforced prescriptions that require, forbid or permit specific actions ... 
. " To view the application of rules to "common-pool resources " from an 
ownership perspective, Schlager and Ostrom categorize rights into two 
classes: operational rights and collective rights. The first subgroup 
consists of the rights of "access and withdrawal," and the second subset 
encompasses "management, exclusion, and alienation."117 Each of these 
categories of rights is dependent on the exercise of the others but are 
distinguishable from each other because they involve "the difference 
between exercising a right and participating in the definition of future 
rights to be exercised .... "118 To illustrate, a prospecting party must 
exercise the rights of accessing or withdrawing a resource (such as 
extracting underground oil) for it to exclude other parties from the 
112. See Mineral rights ownership - what is it and why is it so unique in the USA?,





116. See Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural
Resources, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 249-50 (1992). 
117. Id. at 251.
118. Thomas Sikor et al., Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual
Analysis Revisited, 93 WORLD DEV. 337, 337-38 (May 2017). 
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newly acquired property.119
A severance tax regime is the only tax system that effectively 
corrects the inequity associated with petroleum because it views oil from 
the perspective of Schlager and Ostrom's two-order, property rights 
framework. The first set of rights reflects individual freedoms that each 
person has to remove a resource from its natural environment while the 
second set of rights signify that all people may take advantage of the 
benefits associated with scarce property derived from the earth. 120 
Although severance taxes are so named for being an excise tax "upon all 
persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons engaged in the 
business of severing natural resources from the soil or water ... ,"121 
severance taxes can also be viewed as a method of "severing" the 
public's vested rights in common property by compensating the 
community for excluding freedoms associated with ownership and usage 
of a limited natural resource. 122 Because severance taxes are based on 
the value or quantity of oil extracted, a severance tax system is applied 
in a manner that prioritizes capturing benefits of collective rights rather 
than a share of oil companies' proceeds. Most importantly, such a 
system reserves the benefits of incentivizing productive activity through 
private ownership, retains the benefits of communal ownership, and 
avoids licensing burdens.12a 
Severance taxes are a favorable form of oil tax because they are the 
most practicable tax system in terms of administrative efficiency. "The 
literature on optimal taxation suggests that the government should 
raise revenue by using the tax instruments with the lowest efficiency 
costs."124 Australia's resource rent tax was proposed with the primary 
purpose to avoid distorting business decisions by only taxing profitable 
extraction operations.125 Similarly, some countries like Norway, have 
cost-recovery tax structures that allow an income reduction by a portion 
or all of the start-up costs, and companies who do not have a net 
119. See id.
120. See id. 
121. Act. No. 31, 1920 La. Acts 31 (levying a severance tax on people removing resources 
from the earth). 
122. Jack Mintz & Duanjie Chen, Capturing Ecorwmic Rents from Resources Through 
Royalties And Taxes, 5 SRP RESEARCH PAPERS 1, 1-3 (Oct. 2012). 
123. See Daniel Raimi & Richard G. Newell, How The States Manage Revenue from 
Growing Oil and Natural Gas Production, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Jan. 1, 2017), 
https://scholars.org/brief/how-states-manage-revenue-growing-oil-and-natural-gas­
production ("[D]irecting large shares of oil and gas revenue to state general funds and 
operational expenditures can be risky for year-to-year budgets, primarily due to the 
volatile nature of oil and natural gas prices"). 
124. Carlos de Miguel & Baltasar Manzano, Optimal Oil Taxation in a Small Open 
Ecorwmy, 9 REV. OF ECON. DYNAMICS 438, 440 (2006). 
125. See Osmundsen & Lovas, supra note 65.
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positive tax position are allowed to carry the deductible start-up costs 
forward with interest until the firm has a positive tax position. 126 Any 
benefits gained from these complicated tax schemes are lost due to the 
administrative complexities and informational burdens associated with 
multifaceted tax systems.127 Severance tax systems achieve the goal of 
maximizing revenue collection and reducing the negative economic 
effects of taxes by avoiding the administrative burdens associated with 
calculating oil companies' economic rent and income. 
Although taxes with minimal administrative burdens have a greater 
distortionary effect on business decisions, these effects are minimized by 
the level of economic rent associated with oil profits. The severance tax 
system implemented by state and local governments of the United 
States only accounted for $17 billion of tax revenue, which is only 1 
percent of national, state, and local revenue.128 In general, results show 
that a severance tax reduction in the United States substantially 
reduces state tax revenue but yields little change in oil drilling and 
production activity.129 This is likely because mining activities tend to 
create a higher level of economic rent, which means that oil taxes tend 
not to deter productive activity if imposed at an appropriate rate.130 As a 
result, oil severance taxes can avoid deterring oil extraction by being 
imposed to balance the goals of optimizing revenue collection with the 
risk of deterring business growth, rather than forsaking one priority for 
the other. 
But perhaps the greatest arguments supporting a severance tax 
system on natural resources is the need for frugality through 
diminished consumption, rather than incentivizing consumption 
through efficiency. Prioritizing frugality generates efficiency as a 
secondary consequence and incentivizes redistributing benefits 
126. See id.
127. See id. 
128. See How Do State and Local &verance Tax.es Work?, TAX POLICY GrR. URBAN INST. 
& BROOKINGS INST. (last visited Dec. 2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing­
book/how-do-state-and-local-severance-taxes-work. 
129. See Mitch Kunce, Effectiveness of Severance Tax Incentives in the U.S. Oil Industry,
10 INT'L TAX AND PUB. FINANCE 565, 565 (2003). 
130. See Daniel Raimi, Understanding Pennsylvania s Proposed &verance Tax,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.rff.org/blog/
2017/understanding-pennsylvania-s-proposed-severance-tax ("These taxes are levied on
the volume or value of production, and can be attractive to governments because mining
activities such as oil and gas production often generate economic rents, defined as profits
over and above the levels necessary to incentivize private-sector investment."); JEFFREY
M. DAVIS, ET AL., FISCAL POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN OIL-PRODUCING
CoUNTRIES (J.M. Davis et al. eds., 2003) ("The choice of tax rate [applied to the petroleum
industry] reflects the typically higher economic rent in the petroleum sector").
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associated with scarce resources through a scarcity rent.131 Emphasizing 
frugality through taxation that redistributes natural resource benefits 
has the natural consequence of reducing production and resource 
extraction so that resources are only applied to their most optimal 
uses. 132 This can successfully reconstruct economics to prioritize 
conservation over consumption. 133 Unhindered population growth and 
the resulting increased consumption will lead to rising natural resource 
costs, which will make natural resource taxes increasingly relevant in 
future policy considerations.134 Arguably, tax and economic policy 
should be tailored to direct resource use at a scale which nature can 
sustain. 
An oil revenue fund is a necessary part of a severance tax system to 
address the unpredictable fluctuations in revenue and its impact on a 
government's budgeting. Alaska's permanent fund is a primary example 
of a public tax fund, and North Dakota has a similar provision in its 
constitution that establishes a fund to share benefits over time, which 
requires capturing 30 percent of annual tax receipts to be reserved for 
long-term investment. 135 Without strict enforcement of fiscal 
responsibility, the perfect oil taxation systems will seem irrelevant 
because of the "resource curse" of the volatility, exhaustibility, and 
uncertainty of resources. 136 Regardless of the relatively consistent 
demand for energy-producing resources, the oil industry is susceptible 
to dramatic economic fluctuations that are the result of unpredictable 
supply variances. 137 These fluctuations have been a large part of the 
reason that countries have shifted away from volume-based taxation in 
favor of tax systems that associate their revenue collection with 
131. See HERMAN E. DALY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
47 (2007). 
132. See id.
133. See Sally-Ann Joseph, A global natural resource consumption tax, INT'L Soc'y FOR
ECOLOGICAL ECON. (2012), http://www.isecoeco.org/conferences/isee20l2-versao3/pdf/ 
823.pdf. 
134. See David Funkhouser, Population, Consumption and the Future, CoLUMBIA U.: 
EARTH INST. (Apr. 27, 2012), http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2012/04/27/population­
consumption-and-the-future/. 
135. See Stephen C. Fehr & Melissa Maynard, North Dakota saves for the future with
today's oil riches, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/nation/2013/08/28/north-dakota-oil-money/2715203/. 
136. Azhgaliyeva, supra note 98, at 157-58; Confronting Budget Deficits, 3 IMF 
ECONOMICS lssUES 1 (1996) ("G:ivernment budget deficits (the excess of spending over 
revenue) in industrial countries have been growing as a percent of GDP for the past 20 
years. Large deficits emerged after the oil crisis in the mid-1970s and widened 
dramatically after 1980, largely the result of government overspending rather than 
meager tax receipts"). 
137. See id.
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corporate profits because, although these taxes are administratively 
more difficult to implement, they allow for governments to partake in 
the booms and busts of the industry. 138 To account for the ebbs and 
flows of the oil business, it is necessary for governments to establish 
funds that provide a monetary cushion for decreases in tax revenues 
that result from decreased oil extraction. 
CONCLUSION 
Henry George once said "[t]here is danger in reckless change, but 
greater danger in blind conservatism." 139 The inequities associated with 
owning natural resources under the current property rights regimes 
require a dramatic shift in the way the public views petroleum taxation. 
Historically, petroleum tax systems have been designed to prioritize 
revenue collection, which is exemplified by the trends toward tax 
systems that raise greater and more consistent revenue streams.140 
Although this philosophy has merits regarding the need for public 
funds, the priorities behind tax systems premised on either taking an 
interest in, or sharing in the surplus profits of, the oil industry need to 
be balanced with administrative feasibility and the need for 
implementing an equitable common property system. A severance tax is 
the only administratively effective tax system that fulfills this objective 
by creating a system that supports and reinforces private property 
rights while accounting for the inequities associated with natural 
resources. Although petroleum natural resource taxation is 
predominant in the oil industry because of oil extraction's role in the 
world economy, these principles extend to all-natural resources of 
limited supply, such as rare earth elements, water, and wood.141 The 
petroleum industry is a perfect example of the way a Georgian tax 
system can be used to enforce communal interests in limited natural 
resources. Further analysis of the application of severance taxes to 
other natural resources warrants discussion and may help to change the 
modern view of distributing limited resources. 
138. See Land, supra not.e 61, at 2.
139. HENRY GEORGE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS 18 (1883).
140. See Osmundsen & Lovas, supra not.e 65; The Troubling Trend of Nationalization,
supra not.e 91. 
141. See Daly, et al., supra not.e 10.
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